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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Macroeconomics addresses output, employment and price fluctuations during 
business cycles. Business cycles which capture variation in economic activity emerge 
generally due to instable investment, frequent changes in money and credit through 
banking system and unmanageable haphazard proceedings of wars or political instability. 
Business cycles inherent features of mixed economic system where households and 
businesses composed of different motivations spend and produce, differ in their 
respective economic activities. The occurrence of this difference results in creation of 
waves in economic activities, which are the business cycles [Spencer and Amos (1993)]. 
Output variation in moderate context is either a recession or recovery. During recession 
the economic activity falls which not only reduces employment opportunities but creates 
gap between potential and actual output of an economy. The federal government tries to 
keep the adverse effects of business cycle at bay all together. Economists admit that 
private sector is unable to protect the economy from uncontrolled variations in 
employment and inflation. In this scenario the government’s fiscal management is 
corrective response for the problems of recovery and recession. The government makes 
use of public spending and taxes to minimise the gap of business cycles. This process is 
called fiscal policy and the deliberate government involvement to stabilise economy is 
regarded as discretionary fiscal policy. The government can make use either taxes or 
government spending or both to stabilise economy but in this study we only used 
government spending due to its larger and positive multiplier effects.   
Until the great depression the economic mechanism was based on self-correction. 
By that time, the recurring periods of inflation and unemployment were considered to be 
permanent features of an economy. US president, Hoover was of the belief that “nature 
would cure all, whilst government intervention might ruin all”.1 This is why Hoover 
allowed the slump to “liquidate” itself. Even he let “labour, stocks, and the farmer and 
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real estate to liquidate”2 as on the belief that once the spate of liquidation got completed, 
the economy would return to its normal level of economic activity. 
Fiscal policy-making became essential to address macroeconomic variables in the 
mid of twentieth century. Fatás and Mihov (2000) analysed and assessed the impacts of 
government spending on consumption and employment. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
developed a set up to examine fiscal shocks. Alesina, et al. (2002) estimated the sway of 
government spending shocks on profits and investment. Canzoneri, et al. (2002) studied 
the nexus between monetary and fiscal policy. The government’s stabilising policy 
formulation received serious attention by the end of World War II (1945). At that time 
this economic role of the government was named as Keynesian Economics. The 
Keynesian philosophy was used at Washington D.C. in the US for several decades 
[Spencer and Amos (1993)]. Theoretically, it is the deliberate (discretionary) control 
exercised by the government in the public interest through fiscal instruments. 
Private investors neither invest just because of the economist’s views nor do 
households alter their savings and spending plans, but respond to government decisions 
[Spencer and Amos (1993)]. More recently some Latin American countries introduced fiscal 
reforms to disinflate their respective price levels. In most of the countries even the fiscal 
reforms were either delayed or not implemented fully [Rigbon and Robrto (2002)]. Through 
this paper, we attempted to explore the nexus between fiscal stances, output, employment and 
inflation in Pakistan. Traditionally, the removal of deflationary gap is reflation in economy 
and the reverse is adopted to cure inflationary gap. Generally negative or deflationary output 
gaps are observed in economies, where the government opts for huge budget deficits.  
 
1.2.  Objectives of the Study 
We studied fiscal prudence in Pak-economy to analyse whether policy-makers in 
Pakistan are making use of fiscal framework or not to maintain the economic activity. 
Apart from the causes of recent financial crisis the governments bailed-out the financially 
hopeless institutions. The fiscal instruments of government spending and taxes are used 
by the governments to control the adverse fluctuations in economic activity. Economists 
call the counter-cyclical stance of government through fiscal instruments, discretionary 
fiscal policy.  With positive and bigger size of spending multiplier we concentrated on 
how discrete government spending on development projects like highways and 
infrastructure and current expenditures of interest and defense expenditures influence 
macroeconomic variables of  output, inflation and employment in Pakistan.  
The main objective of the study is to analyse the effect of government spending on 
its output, employment and inflation in Pakistan. Further, how various forms of current 
government spending influence the variables of out, employment and inflation.   
The study objectives are summarised as; 
 How fiscal tools are used by the policy-makers for devising fiscal policy. 
 How government current and development expenditures influence output, 
employment and inflation in Pakistan. 
 What is the size of fiscal discretion and what is its impact on output, 
employment and inflation. 
 
2Ibid. 
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This study is organised as follows; Section 2 highlights the fiscal policy 
background and its instruments. Section 3 is based on review of fiscal literature. Section 
4 gives fiscal discretion in Pakistan. Section 5 covers the methodology and Section 6 is 
about findings while Section 7 provides conclusions and suggestion. 
 
2.  FISCAL POLICY 
The long tried macro-economic problem by the fiscal policy is whether 
government spending measures can restore an economy to its potential level of gross 
domestic product (GDP) by minimising the output gaps [Spencer and Amos (1993)]. 
The presence of constitution and other political institutions restrict the discretionary 
powers of the sovereign. North and Weingast (1989) noted that the reputation plays 
an important role in limiting the sovereign’s apt to renege and it is formalised into 
game theory models. They deduced that successful performance of economy is only 
possible when political institutions limit the economic intervention that is, the 
constitutional restrictions must be self-enforcing.  At the same time this approach 
eliminates the possibility of state absolutism. The study necessitates the execution of 
public laws and expenditures to be the subject of public budgetary policy. While the 
parliament need to play a significant role in budgetary decisions over the revenue 
expenditures and investment expenditures. In the early years, 1940s fiscal or the 
budgetary policy was presented in two parts;  
(i) The first one above-the-line that is, ordinary government expenditures and 
revenue, and 
(ii) The second one below-the-line that is, capital/development expenditures. 
This distinction is made for the sake of increased fiscal role in economic activism along 
with the arithmetic of whether or not the government expenditures are covered through 
taxation. The novelty of the study is how the embedded change in government spending 
as a fiscal tool influences the output, employment and inflation of an economy.  
 
2.1.  Fiscal Instruments 
 
2.1.1.  Taxes 
Taxes are the complementary payments made to governments. Direct taxes are 
deducted from entrepreneurial and corporate income while the indirect taxes are imposed 
on economic activities of production, consumption and distribution. Taxes stand as 
withdrawals from economy are necessarily dependent on real output of an economy. 
Direct taxes influence the disposable income of economic agents while the indirect tax is 
double edged sword as it increases cost of living as well as cost of production. The taxes 
reduce the size of multiplier [William and Michael (1991)]. It adds fuel to fire by 
deteriorating the terms of trade and international competitiveness.  
Fiscal policy makes use of taxes and government spending as fiscal tools to 
manage the economic activities in an economy. Governments use these instruments to 
achieve their macro-economic objectives besides stability in output gaps. The use of 
these tools describes the nature of this policy i.e. expansionary fiscal policy which is 
either reduction in taxes or increase in government spending and contractionary fiscal 
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policy which is either increase in taxes or reduction in government spending. The tax 
multiplier is calculated as; 
                      
       
 
where, MPC is marginal propensity to consume, MPM is marginal propensity to import, 
MPS is marginal propensity to save. 
 
2.1.2.  Government Spending   
Government spending consists of the public money spent to provide social goods 
such as public goods and merit goods. The size of government spending varies with 
government role but it is independent of profit expectations and way beyond minimum 
level of society needs. Government spending has prompt and significant effect on the 
aggregate demand and it is a key fiscal tool. It is part of the aggregate demand that is why 
any change in government spending has a shift effect in aggregate demand and due to 
multiplier effect a dollar change in government spending has multiplier size time’s 
impact on GDP.  
                    
 
       
 
where MPS is marginal propensity to save, MPM is marginal propensity to import while 
the required change in government spending is given by 
                     
                             
          
 
where GDP is gross domestic output  
Spending multiplier is always larger in size as compared to tax multiplier that is 
why it is more effective on aggregate demand [William and Michael (1991)]. So 
primarily government spending is used to reduce unemployment. A secondary argument 
put forward by John Kenneth Galbraith and others is the allocation of resources for 
socially optimum levels of economic activities i.e., pollution control, social goods 
provision and help for hard core unemployment. 
 
3.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
3.1.  Theoretical Approaches 
Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1995) found very low absolute valued correlations 
in OECD countries between government spending and output. Eichenbaum (1997) found 
counter-cyclical discretionary neither to be desirable nor politically feasible. Taylor 
(2000) described fiscal policy rule with budget surplus as a function of output gap. He 
named the fraction of the balance explained by output gap as “automatic stabilisers”, 
while the structural residual part of this regression reflects the fiscal discretion. This 
question is considered similar to the institutional role of political institutions in forming 
economic policy [Drazen (2002); Persson (2001)]. Rules constraining government 
spending do not have universal support as these limit the policy flexibility to respond 
emergencies, economic fluctuations and voters varying fiscal needs. Simply these rules 
can choke off government spending [Saade (2002)].  
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We observed consensus in modern macroeconomic literature on the use of fiscal 
and monetary policies as stabilising tool. More significantly, fiscal policy influences 
directly the GDP and employment. This consensus drew much attention due to the 
conflicting debate present between two economists groups, one Friedman from Chicago 
and the other Modigliani from the MIT [Blanchard and Cohen (2002)]. Fatás and Mihov 
(2003) discussed how harmful can the fiscal discretion be for macroeconomic variables if 
policy makers are not restricted. The linking of macroeconomic volatility to policy 
discretion has raised the question of why cross-country dispersion is caused due to fiscal 
policy use. 
Fiscal policy after passing through the phase of disfavour is now re-emerging from 
its last decade wise since the Second World War [Buti (2003)]. The role of fiscal policy 
as a stabilising tool became questionable since mid-1970s [Buti and Noord (2004)]. 
Traditional Keynesians consider the fiscal policy to be counter-cyclical during recession 
vice versa during boom, as there exists a positive correlation between tax rates and output 
while the correlation between government spending and output is negative [Hunt (2005)]. 
 
3.2.  Discretionary Policies and Their Impact  
Fiscal policy has two versions older one is based on demand-side which is 
consequential of Keynesian economics. It concludes that deflationary gap occurs due to 
insufficient aggregate demand while inflationary gap exists due to excessive aggregate 
demand. During recession a fiscal expansion and a vice versa approach in boom period is 
made to stabilise the economy. Though the Keynesian economists suggest corporate tax 
adjustment that is a relaxation in direct taxes to counter recession and increase in direct 
tax during boom. This paper advocates the increase in government spending to boost 
investment which will encourage firms to employ more workers. Increase in public 
spending on education, training and health care will improve labour productivity and a 
reduction in production costs. It can reduce or even eliminate natural rate of 
unemployment. Budget deficits arising from the removal economic recession through 
discretionary fiscal policy will cause crowding-out effect. This creates hurdles in 
economic activities and quite often used in pre-election year. To avoid this legal 
obligation of maintaining balanced budget needs to be introduced. It will act as a 
mechanism to limit government’s discrete powers to change fiscal tools [Buchanan 
(1968); Brennan and Buchanan (1980)]. 
Deviations in government spending share of gross national product correlate 
negatively growth and saving rates, [Barro (1990)]. Even the permanent increase in 
government spending influences the variation of real GDP from potential is temporary, 
however this shift will result in inflation. This theory is proved through recent research 
conducted by Taylor (1993) and Blanchard and Perotti (1999). Taylor (1993), argued that 
the fiscal discretion could make the central bank job more difficult i.e. central bank 
professionals might take time to forecast the size of fiscal proposals. He admitted that 
discretionary fiscal policy in the past is associated with implementation lags, 
irreversibility and political constraints and believed that these were reinforced by the 
explicit and pre-emptive way that the monetary policy had been used in the most recent 
decade. Alesina and Perotti (1994), argue that a government with lower concentration 
(Herfindahl index) has high discretion, as coalitions and fiscal deadlocks delay the 
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stabilisation and increase discretionary spending. Particularly, the removal of recession 
by increasing aggregate demand which can cause budget deficit but this deficit can be 
eliminated on the medium run by the economic expansion experienced through fiscal 
relaxation. Gavin and Perotti (1997) study of Latin American countries demonstrate the 
fiscal policy as pro-cyclical. This is only possible if strict fiscal rules are adhered in the 
fiscal tool management, regardless of the phase of business cycle [Stiglitz (2000); Tobin 
(1998) and Lipses and Chrystal (1999)]. 
An increase in fiscal policy discretion volatility by 1.0 percentage points reduces 
the economic growth by 0.8 percentage points [Blanchard (1993); Alesina and Perotti 
(1996)]. Dixit and Lambertini (2001) and Dixit (2001)] concluded that fiscal discretion 
destroys monetary commitment. Discretionary government spending has negative 
relation with the size of the government as big governments generally have stable 
spending and big automatic stabilizers [Fatás and Mihov (2001)].  Persson and Tabellini 
(2001) argue that the presidential system is associated with more discretionary spending, 
as in parliamentary system the executive is elected through different parties present in the 
parliament. This is why it is constrained in implementation of discretionary policy due to 
the no confidence vote threat. The debate during 1980s exposed reservations about the 
discretionary fiscal policy use to achieve economic objectives. In poor countries it is 
common that the business cycle is relatively volatile due to less developed financial 
markets and this is why income or GDP per person is negatively related to discretionary 
spending [Rand and Tarp (2002)]. They found a positive relation between inflation and 
discretionary government spending volatility as higher inflation more price volatility, 
ultimately affecting discretionary spending. Political and institutional hurdles affect the 
fiscal tuning of the business cycle [European Commission (2002)]. Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002) structural VAR literature based seminal paper regarded discretionary fiscal policy 
as a residual i.e. the unexplained shock of automatic fiscal policy reactions is fiscal 
discretion. Discretionary fiscal policy advocates suggest the government to make active 
use of fiscal instruments to reduce recessionary and inflationary pressures from the 
economy. Fatás and Mihov (2003) analysed the political and institutional determinants of 
discretionary fiscal policy along with the respective effects on output volatility and 
economic growth. They named the change in fiscal stances which is neither automatic 
response to economic conditions nor related to persistent changes in budget items, as 
discretion. On the basis of the data set used by them revealed that highly volatile 
discretionary fiscal policy exerts strong stabilising effects on economy. They 
accomplished that institutional arrangements which constrain discretion via checks and 
balances allow nations to achieve high growth rates and reduction in macroeconomic 
instability. According to European Commission’s 2004 analysis, the fiscal policy 
responds to both demand and supply side shocks effectively. It holds for automatic 
stabilisers and discretionary fiscal policy. Marco and Paul’s (2004), results matched the 
findings of  Hagen (2002), who used the same fiscal policy indicator focusing only on 
pre-elections years without distinguishing between expenditures and revenue changes. 
Economic theory advocates that with given monetary policy, the fiscal change causes a 
shift in aggregate demand curve. A fiscal stimulus—an increase in either government 
spending or reduction in taxes results in rightward shift in aggregate demand and the 
reverse shift due to fiscal contraction. Hunt (2005) analysis concludes that the pro-
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cyclicality of Irish feasible discretionary government investment arises by design. He 
further concluded that government expenditures are strongly influenced by fiscal 
rectitude deliberations rather than GDP growth rate. Policymakers devote resources for 
capital expenditures when economic activity generates such resources i.e. it is residual of 
budgetary process [Hunt (2005)].  
Kalckreuth and Wolf (2007) exposed the difficulty associated with the 
identification of systematic fiscal discretion in assessing the effects of fiscal tools on the 
macroeconomic variables. They titled fiscal policy based on real time GDP as 
discretionary, while the true state economy based as automatic fiscal policy. The 
president can use discretionary policy more easily either for opportunistic or enthusiastic 
reasons. Therefore presidential rules are more with volatile discretionary policy [Afonso, 
Agnello, and Furceri (2008)]. Most of the studies provide evidence about the strong and 
negative relationship between discretionary government spending and the quality of the 
institutions along with political and budgetary constraints [Afonso, Agnello, and Furceri 
(2008)]. 
 
4.  FISCAL DISCRETION IN PAKISTAN 
Economists agree that perfect competition in its purest form does not exist. This is 
why Pak-Economy too features imperfectly competitive market structures. At political 
level in Pakistan there are mainly two big political parties that is a feature of duopolistic 
political system. In political system there are only two big parties while in production 
there are few large firms in every sector. North and Weingast (1989) necessitated the 
government not to just set the rules for economic growth but also make concrete 
commitment to achieve it. This commitment can be reflected through responsible 
behaviour and rules constraining the behaviour of the ruler from violating the binding. 
They marked the point of not displaying the former in the very spirit as irregular fiscal 
discretion eventually made the rulers to behave irresponsibly.  
The Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England defined the roles of parliament, 
Crown and judiciary independent of the influence of Crown. In the early decades of the 
seventeenth century, England’s fiscal needs increased the discretion i.e. expropriation of 
wealth through redefined rights in favour of the government. This sovereign act loomed a 
civil war. It resulted in monarchy due to failed attempts to institutionalise. North and 
Weingast (1989) termed this all for the redesign of fiscal fundamentals and government 
institutions. They believed that these institutions created an explicit limit over the 
Crown’s ability to alter the terms of agreements unilaterally as it had to obtain 
parliamentary assent to bring any change to agreements. The institutional structure 
evolved through 1688 not only caped the king’s ability to renege but eliminated the 
incentives for the parliament to act in irresponsible way.  
When perfect competition does not exist in an economy then private sector alone 
cannot eliminate unemployment [Spencer and Amos (1993)]. In the light of above 
economic view private sector could not reduce unemployment from Pak-Economy. Since 
the creation of Pakistan military and political rule played hide and seek but the difference 
in the two rules was probably the size of cabinet. Chaudhary and Ahmed (1995) 
determined that fiscal expansion financed through banks causes inflation. Despite the 
governess issue and consistently worsened economic variables of growth, inflation and 
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employment every government sworn in with claims of curbing inflation and 
unemployment. The policy-makers did devise policies but it contributed little to economy 
and its stakeholders. This deliberate fiscal management to overcome output growth, 
inflation and unemployment increased the importance of fiscal discretion not only in the 
world but also for Pakistan. 
The most consistent feature of Pakistan economy is persistent lower employment 
level which creates recession or deflationary gap. In Pakistan the size of public sector is 
comparatively bigger so does its role in addressing macroeconomic variables. On the 
basis of the data set used in the study the average size of government spending stayed at 
22 percent with lower limit of 19 percent and upper limit of 33 percent of GDP. But the 
alarming aspect of this government spending composition is gigantic size of current 
expenditures as a percentage of total government spending and it remained 75 percent to 
85 percent of government spending.  Among current expenditures the defense and 
interest payments took the biggest chunk away. 
The paper describes the need of flawless fiscal stances of the government which 
can win the confidence of the residence and cultivate required resources for growth or 
such other targets. To reduce output gaps fiscal reflation is made by policy makers. Now 
the paper quests the financing of this fiscal expansion. Pak-economy since its creation 
suffered from fiscal imbalances that are the government spending supersedes tax 
revenues. This not only widened the gap between taxes and spending but also raised the 
Pak-economy debt. In case the government borrows from domestic market the discount 
rate will go up by drying the credit availability for private sector. When factor inputs like 
oil, gas and electricity will become expensive consequently cost of production will rise. 
The producers will either produce less causing unemployment or transfer the whole 
burden of taxes to the public, in either case public welfare will be lost. Psychologically 
workers will lose their morale and health due to this fiscal hostility and family life peace 
too will be lost. Labour productivity will fall; output and employment will follow the 
same direction. 
 
5.  METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1.  Theoretical Background 
Fatás and Mihov framed three questions, first how harmful is discretionary fiscal 
policy for the economy, second what are the political and institutional factors that shape 
fiscal policy and third the absence of political constraints in explaining the fiscal policy 
by other political and institutional variables [Fatás and Mihov (2003)]. Even they gave 
schematically organised role of policy and institutions through which growth is attained 
i.e. political and institutional set up—discretionary fiscal policy—output volatility—
growth. The fiscal rules causal effect and institutions’ disclaimer literature reveals the 
possibility that the fiscal rules and fiscal outcomes are driven by the preferences of the 
fiscal policy makers. As any policy maker deciding on the fiscal stance can influence the 
institutions conducting this fiscal policy [Poterba (1996); de Haan, et al. (1999); IMF 
(2009)]. Debrun and Kumar 2007 highlight the presence of disciplined government for 
adopting strict institutions.  
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Buti and Noord (2004) exposed the ineffectiveness of fiscal policy under certain 
restrictions such as demise of macroeconomic policy stabilisation tools and real business 
cycle as an equilibrium response to supply side shocks. Dixit and Lambertini (2001) and 
Dixit (2001) assumed a game theory based perspective about monetary and fiscal 
authorities in minimising a quadratic loss function of inflation and output. The theoretical 
fiscal literature predicts that opportunists manipulate fiscal tools before elections and it 
found support in Persson and Tabellini (2002a) and (2002b), Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and 
Rostango (2002) empirical work to some extent. The EMU decomposed the fiscal 
balance as neutral stance and fiscal stimulus. The neutrality of the fiscal policy was 
materialised if its primary policy expenditures grow along the GDP rate plus the targeted 
inflation, while the tax revenue grows parallel to nominal GDP. Thus government’s 
deviation from this criterion is discretionary fiscal policy [European Commission (2004) 
and Larch and Salto (2003)]. Blinder (2004) and Auerbach (2002) argued about 
politicians’ political acuity if responded precisely to the output gap then Taylor (2000) 
guesstimates will reflect automatic as well as systematic discretionary fiscal policy. Hunt 
(2005) decomposed the total government spending into discretionary and non-
discretionary constituents. He further adjusted the discretionary constituent to the styled 
feasible discretionary government consumption, investment, and current transfers. 
Feasible discretionary consumption subjects to government consumption policy choice 
based on both legal obligations and political imperatives i.e. a government choosing not 
to pay public servants, to default its national debt obligations, speculatively. Feasible 
government investment is total government capital expenditures less transfers. Perfect 
discretionary government consumption takes total government current expenditures 
adjusted for the national debt servicing cost and management. European Union annual 
budget contribution and the costs the government is legally required to fund such as 
judiciary and state head remuneration. Yearly enhanced wage bills of public sector 
employees and a pay raise higher than consumer price inflation are treated as feasible 
discretionary consumption items [Hunt (2005)].  
 
5.2.  Methodology  
Our study attempts to describe the discretionary fiscal policy by referring 
changes in government spending, which is not automatically linked to the business 
cycle. In fact, these changes probably emerge due to unplanned fiscal policy. To infer 
government spending based fiscal discretion, changes in government spending is 
observed. The handling of fiscal discretion is quite complex due to simultaneity 
involved in deterministic and dependent variables. This difficulty is reduced by 
focusing only on the government spending. Generally change in government 
spending is supposed to respond economic activity in the economy. The economic 
activity is based on output, employment and inflation mainly. This is why the paper 
attempted the theoretical arguments of how a change in current and development 
government spending particularly affect output, employment and inflation in an 
economy. That is, the government spending is a function of its own lag spending, 
output, employment level and inflation. Government spending lag is introduced as 
current government spending depends along with other things on the spending of the 
previous year.  
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The government spending is a comprised of many items but in this study i t is 
broken down into defense expenditures, interest payments, non-defense current 
expenditures, non-interest current expenditures and non-defense and non-interest 
current expenditures. These are included to see their respective influence of each 
variable on economic activities of the country i.e. how the government expenditure 
change responded the output, employment and inflation in the economy. Inflation is 
included in the model to tackle the multicollinearity as it causes all the deterministic 
variables to increase relatively at the same rate. The estimation process used in the 
study to make the data set stationary is difference based stationarity, which removed 
the random walk phenomenon or unit-root. In case of real values the same data set 
was stationary at level except the variables of inflation and employment, i.e. , 
inflation was stationary at first difference while employment was stationary for 
intercept and intercept and trend at first difference and the for none this variable was 
stationary at level.  
In time-series regressions involving economic variables at level, give misleading 
results that is, a high R
2 
even without causal relationship between dependent and 
independent variables has no inferential value [Harvey (1980)]. Granger and Newbold 
1974 findings encouraged the researchers to opt first difference of time-series data to 
eliminate spurious correlations associated with the model variables [Granger and 
Newbold (1974)]. The study envisaged a model containing differenced variables to avoid 
limited information based inferential regression decisions. 
Taking first difference of the variables involved in a time-series regression model 
ameliorates the existence of possible multicollinearity among explanatory variables of the 
model [Burt (1987)]. According to Fox, multicollinearity exists generally from economic 
cycles of prices, output, consumption and production. The presence of inter-correlation 
due to the reasons cited above is reduced mostly, by first differencing. Even the presence 
of serial correlation in the residual terms is also handled by taking first difference [Fox 
(1958)]. Econometric texts of the 1970s by Dutta, Kmenta, Maddala and Murphy 
recommended first differencing to tackle multicollinearity [Burt (1987)]. This is why we 
took first difference and for further analysis logarithms are taken, which give average 
growth of model variables.    
Besides this the study aimed to assess the extent to which the discretionary 
measures were/are countercyclical. The government spending is further fragmented into 
current expenditures and development expenditures. The current expenditures are divided 
into the following categories; 
 Defense expenditures 
 Interest payments 
 Non-defense current expenditures 
 Non-interest current expenditures 
 Non-defense and non-interest current expenditures 
∆Gt = α + β∆Yt + γ∆Gt–1 + δEM + ηInf + Єt … … … … (A) 
∆Gct = α + β∆Yt + γ∆Gct–1 + δEM + ηInf + Єt … … … … (1) 
∆GDt = α + β∆Yt + γ∆GDt–1 + δEM + ηInf + Єt … … … … (2) 
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Where ∆Gt = government expenditures,    
 ∆Gct = current govt. expenditures 
 ∆GDt = development based govt. expenditures  
 Y = GDP 
 EM = employment level     
 Gt–1 = lag based government expenditures 
 Inf = inflation rate 
The novel contribution sought through this study is expressed by the following 
econometric equations; 
∆Gdcet  = α + β∆Yt + γ∆Gdcet–1 + δEM + ηInf + Єt … … … (3) 
∆Gicet  = α + β∆Yt + γ∆Gicet–1 + δEM + ηInf + Єt … … … (4) 
∆Gndcet  = α + β∆Yt + γ∆Gndcet–1 + δEM + ηInf + Єt … … … (5) 
∆Gnicet  = α + β∆Yt + γ∆Gnicet–1 + δEM + ηInf + Єt … … … (6) 
∆G(nd&ni)cet  = α + β∆Yt + γ∆G(nd&ni)cet–1 + δEM + ηInf + Єt … … (7) 
The regression equation ‘A’ is a modified form of the model from Fatás and Mihov 
(2003), which was used for quantitative estimates of discretionary policy. The term ‘Є’t 
will measure the degree of discretion and the variation in discretion will be denoted 
by√        . A similar regression model was used by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) for 
U.S. quarterly data and Alesina, et al. (2002). for OECD data. Synchronous values of 
GDP growth; past values are used as instrumental variables to avoid the endogeneity bias. 
The political system of Pakistan is based on parliament headed by the prime minister but 
the study deduces through practice that the president remained more powerful than the 
prime minister. Most of the ordinances are produced through president house. Presence of 
presidential influence commands more for the evidence of fiscal discretion. Through 
market structure too, the study concludes the existence of discretionary fiscal policy in 
Pakistan i.e. despite the collation government one party throughout the country’s political 
history, ruled the rest with a dominant role. The economic theory longed that one 
dominant player always exercise its monopoly power which is simply the discretionary 
power in case of dominant political party. Further, it is amended by adding the variable 
EM as deterministic variable. Equations from 1 to 7 are extended version of equation A 
to capture the impact of each deterministic variable.  
where  
 ∆Gdce t = change in govt. spending on defense current expenditures 
 ∆Gicet = change in govt. spending on interest payments 
 ∆Gndcet = change in govt. spending on non-defense current expenditures 
 ∆Gnicet = change in govt. spending on non-interest payments 
 ∆G(nd&ni)cet = change in govt. spending on non-defense current expenditures and non-
interest payments 
Now to study the link between discretionary government spending and output 
variation, the data vulnerability is used and equation ‘B’, ‘C’ & ‘D’ serve this purpose. 
This technique was used by Fatás and Mihov (2003) and is modified according to the 
51:4, 350 Ismail and Husain 
 
study requirement. The previous regression analysis exhibit the relationship between 
output volatility and estimated variability in fiscal (government spending) discretion.  
log(σyt)  = θ + λ log(σ
Є
t) + μ
ʹ
Xt + νt … … … … (B) 
log(σEMt)  = θ + λ log(σ
Є
t) + μ
ʹ
Xt + νt … … … … (C) 
log(σInft)  = θ + λ log(σ
Є
t) + μ
ʹ
Xt + νt … … … … (D) 
On the basis of correlation between policy discretion, output volatility and ratio of 
import and export to GDP will be included to conduct following regression analysis. The 
inclusion variables is from arguments of Galí (1994), Fatás and Mihov (2001) and Rodrík 
(1998). Where 
 σyt = standard deviation of annual growth rate in GDP per capita 
 σЄt = volatility in government spending discretion  
 σEMt = standard deviation of annual change employment level 
 σInft = standard deviation of annual change in inflation rate 
 Xt = ratio of import and export to GDP  
Once the discretion of fiscal policy is identified, then its relation with output and 
employment will be evaluated using standard economic tools. The data will be obtained 
from State Bank of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, and Federal Bureau of Statistics. 
In the study the model represented by Equation A is estimated both with nominal 
variable data and with real variable data. The notable point raised in the study is that the 
error term Єt which describes the size of unexplained variation i.e. fiscal discretion is 
used to find the standard deviation of Єt to measure fiscal discretion volatility unlike 
white noise only, an error term for the non-stationary time series data. Another way the 
study addresses the academicians and policy makers to look at the modeling is the 
relationship developed to disclose the economic significance for Pakistan economy. 
The presence of fiscal discretion is not found through hypothesis testing rather it is 
evident through the existence of error term Єt.. And this error term remained non-zero 
throughout the estimation process over the period from 1971 to 2009 that is, the fiscal 
discretion based on government spending is present in Pakistan economy. 
 
5.3.  Data 
Generally the integral feature of economic research is to analyse data and then 
theorise it for economic policy management. To serve this purpose the data reliability and 
accuracy play an important role in research conduction. Empirical precision and 
economic interpretation depend solely on data source.  Our study is based on time series 
data set. In time series econometrics the analysis are either based on forecasting or 
dynamically structured modelling associated with hypothesis testing. This study is based 
on dynamic inter-relationship among model variables existing in Pakistan economy since 
1971. Annual data is used for Pakistan economy to estimate the equations modelled in the 
methodology section of the study. The study was limited to this annual data only because 
of the unavailability of quarterly data on macroeconomic variables used in the study. The 
study attempts to present and enumerate the discretionary shocks on macroeconomic 
variables of Pakistan economy such as; inflation, employment and output. But still the 
data set contains some thirty nine years observations.  
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In the original model the panel data set is used for ninety one countries including 
Pakistan economy. For this study the model is modified with the inclusion of two more 
explanatory variables of inflation and employment from Pakistan economy. The main 
reason behind the inclusion of these variables is to investigate whether the government 
spending is macroeconomic stability driven or not, if yes then to what extent these 
variables were brought to vary within the targeted range. In this study the time series data 
set is used to fulfil the country specific macroeconomic analysis.  
A time series data suffers from the problems of non-stationarity, autocorrelation, 
very high R
2 
even for the variables with no meaningful relationship and random walk 
phenomenon. To a greater extent this type of data is assumed to provide predictive 
information only. Considering these featuristic limitations of the time series data, the data 
used in this study was passed through some econometric filters to attain econometric 
purification. The unit-root test was applied to check the data stationarity of the data set of 
this study. 
It was observed that almost all the variables are stationary at the first difference. 
The elimination of non-stationarity made the data free from autocorrelation and 
possibility of spuriousness among the model’s variable regression analysis. To make 
study independent of mere forecasts, some meaningful variables of inflation and 
employment were added. This approach not only made the study dynamic for academic 
purposes but also for policy making. 
 
5.4.  Variable Advocacy 
Fiscal tools have multiplier effects on real variables of the economy but there 
exists a unique difference in the multiplier impact of government spending and tax. 
Pakistan economy is typical developing country with substantially high debt, looming 
inflation and unemployment, unfavourable balance of payments at current account etc. 
The size of government spending varies between 19 to 33 percent and on average 22 
percent since 1971. Being the component of GDP, the government spending is an 
impulse to other variables of inflation and employment. The government spending is 
assumed to bump up output and employment but reduce inflation. To analyse the actual 
impact of government spending it is broken down into two main components of; 
Development Expenditures, and  
Current Expenditures. 
According to Overlapping-Generations model government spending enhances 
output by boosting research and development, education, employment and welfare, 
Diamond (1965). The diagram below shows an inclining trend in current expenditures 
which are on average 75 to 85 percent of government spending (Economic Survey of 
Pakistan), while development expenditures are declining and far lower than current 
expenditures over the given period except some fluctuations. 
This variation commands the study to address the questions framed during the 
theorisation of variable advocacy. To the end, these are included in the model. The 
variable of trade is included as a control variable to address output variation along with 
the fiscal policy as suggested by Rodrik (1998), while the other control variables such as 
inflation and employment are included to assess the impact of fiscal discretion and 
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evaluate the link between them. Another reason for the inclusion of these variables in 
equation ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘D’ is to explore the possible economic significance for both 
academic and policy making purposes. 
 
6.  FINDINGS 
A noticeable feature of the estimation is very small R
2 
value but it is in accordance 
with econometric literature available on time series data i.e. the difference based OLS 
estimations observe a small sum of squared residuals [Plosser and Schwert (1977)]. Time 
series estimations made at level give high R
2 
but with first difference based estimations 
reveal lower values of R
2
, this variation in R
2 
due to change in time series equation from 
level to difference makes it least important in this context
  
[Harvey (1980)]. The 
estimations made in this section of the study are over the period of thirty nine years, 
starting from 1971. This section represents the empirical analysis tables for each 
equations followed by the graphical and theoretical support to state the economic 
meanings of this estimation drawn by digging the time series data deep.  
 
∆Gt = α + β∆Yt + γ∆Gt–1 + δEM + ηInf + Єt 
Intercept 0.003 (0.096) 
Output Volatility 0.576 (1.323) 
Govt. Spending Lag1 0.101 (0.596) 
Employment Level –0.001 (-0.018) 
Inflation 0.016 (0.404) 
R
2 
0.148 
 
In this main model of the study, except government spending lag for real data no 
other independent variable influenced the dependent variable of government spending 
significantly, over the period of time of the data set. The study observes that the public 
policy-makers did not use government spending to counter the output gap, high 
unemployment sustained in the economy. It means that policy-makers and rulers did not 
change their spending habits for psychological, technological or institutional reasons, 
which is quests the planning process as well as the economic intellect of the planners 
over this period of time. 
 
∆Gct = α + β∆Yt + γ∆Gct–1 + δEM + ηInf + Єt 
Intercept 0.041 (0.373) 
Output Volatility 0.590 (1.147) 
Govt. Spending on CE Lag1 –0.004 (–0.022) 
Employment Level –0.010 (–0.152) 
Inflation –0.002 (–0.058) 
R
2 
0.065 
 
The second attempt of the study is based on the government spending analysis on 
the basis of current and capital expenditures made in the Pak-Economy. The above table 
gives the empirical outcome of current expenditure based auto regression results. Again 
on market price basis the public financial management does not reflect counter cyclical 
approach as all independent variables are insignificant.  
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∆GDt = α + β∆Yt + γ∆GDt–1 + δEM + ηInf + Єt 
Intercept –0.081 (–0.478) 
Output Volatility 0.508 (0.654) 
Govt. Spending on DE Lag1 0.136 (0.901) 
Employment Level 0.034 (0.327) 
Inflation 0.049 (0.734) 
R
2 0.117 
 
For the capital expenditures, the explanatory variables have no significant impact 
except the lag-based capital expenditures of the data set. It shows insensitivity of the 
policy makers to technological changes and employment generating project planning. 
The inverse relation between dependent and its lag independent variable discloses a 
decline in current year followed by last year rise in development expenditures rather it 
should exhibit a positive relation according to economic theory. 
 
∆Gdcet  = α + β∆Yt + γ∆Gdcet–1 + δEM + ηInf + Єt 
Intercept –0.004 (–0.024) 
Output Volatility –0.142 (–1.152) 
Govt. Spending on DFE Lag1 0.162 (0.924) 
Employment Level 0.018 (0.148) 
Inflation 0.039 (0.481) 
R
2 0.036 
 
The defence expenditures are not influenced by explanatory variables for the 
nominal data set but for real data set intercept, employment level and inflation are 
significant that is the defence spending is responsive to change in these control variables. 
The intercept significance shows Random Walk with Drift and this intercept component 
of defence spending is independent of any other economic variable. The study observes a 
positive correlation between output volatility and defence spending and an inverse 
relation with employment level and inflation. It means an increase in output; inflation and 
employment level will result in increase and reduce defence spending respectively. 
   
∆Gicet  = α + β∆Yt + γ∆Gicet–1 + δEM + ηInf + Єt 
Intercept 0.464 (2.154) 
Output Volatility 1.485 (1.523) 
Govt. Spending on IE Lag1 –0.395 (–3.934) 
Employment Level –0.385 (–2.942) 
Inflation 0.128 (1.510) 
R
2 0.529 
 
The interest spending of the government for nominal data set, the intercept, lag-
interest spending and employment level contribute significantly to explain the dependent 
variable of the above regression equation. Intercept has significant Random Walk Drift 
impact on dependent variable. Negative coefficient of government debt servicing shows a 
reduction in current year spending if lag spending is increased. It is questionable as it is 
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not supported by the debt servicing data over the study period. An increase in 
employment level is only possible if debt servicing falls otherwise reverse is true and 
study observes it as a consequence of ever rising debt of the country. Further the study 
finds that increase in inflation resulting in swelling of interest payments. 
 
∆Gndcet  = α + β∆Yt + γ∆Gndcet–1 + δEM + ηInf + Єt  
Intercept 0.015 (0.103) 
Output Volatility 0.675 (0.978) 
Govt. Spending on NDFE Lag1 –0.050 (–0.278) 
Employment Level 0.012 (0.139) 
Inflation –0.010 (–0.174) 
R
2 0.041 
 
The control variables of this auto regression model equation for the data set are 
insignificant which means either these variables have no economic significance on non-
defence government spending or change in these variables is so small that the policy 
makers were not attracted by this variation at all. In either case the study deems it as a 
professional lapse on behalf of the public financial experts of the nation. 
 
∆Gnicet  = α + β∆Yt + γ∆Gnicet–1 + δEM + ηInf + Єt  
Intercept 0.030 (0.253) 
Output Volatility 0.615 (1.132) 
Govt. Spending on NIE Lag1 –0.147 (–0.844) 
Employment Level 0.014 (0.196) 
Inflation –0.026 (–0.541) 
R
2 0.066 
 
The explanatory variables for this equation for nominal data set have no significant 
impact on non-interest government spending. It means increase in inflation will reduce 
non-interest government spending or increase debt servicing. 
 
∆G(nd&ni)cet  = α + β∆Yt + γ∆G(nd&ni)cet–1 + δEM + ηInf + Єt 
Intercept –0.041 (–0.241) 
Output Volatility 0.822 (1.033) 
Govt. Spending on NDFNIE Lag1 –0.209 (–1.231) 
Employment Level 0.077 (0.737) 
Inflation –0.058 (–0.825) 
 R
2 0.102 
 
Here for nominal data set the study finds no significant impact of independent 
variables on non-defense and non-interest government spending. The study finds 
variation in independent variables is either insignificant or the level and direction of 
discretion is independent of macroeconomic variables. It means neither institutional nor 
technological changes to achieve desired size of these control variables influenced the no-
defence and non-interest public spending.  
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Based on empirical results the study finds reasonable size of fiscal discretion but 
this discrete public spending is not in the line of output changes, employment and 
inflation variations. This confirms the fiscal economic theory as sustained portion of 
government spending is based on current expenditures of debt servicing and defence. The 
development expenditures in Pakistan remained 15 to 25 percent of total government 
spending that is why Pak-economy observed insignificant improvement in real output and 
ultimately it suffered from severe inflation and unemployment. Our study concludes that 
discrete spending will stay insignificant in Pakistan until its current expenditures are too 
high as compared to development expenditures. According to tax collection figures the 
indirect taxes are significantly larger than direct taxes, which is totally against the fiscal 
economics spirit. Indirect taxes of sales and excise caused an increase in cost of 
production as these are regressive in nature. It is a major cause for macroeconomic 
variables’ adverse volatility. 
Graphical part of the study shows possible relation between fiscal discretion and 
macroeconomic variables of output, employment and inflation the data is divided in 
different segments on the basis of political and non-political rule in the country. This 
approach allows the study to present regime specific correlation between fiscal discretion 
and variation in independent variables of the model. Over the period of data set used, the 
study depicted a difference in trends that is why through scatter sketched trends are 
shown to highlight the regime specific influence of fiscal discretion on output, 
employment and inflation variables of Pak-Economy.  
 
Fiscal Discretion and Output Variation  
 
 
The study exhibited a positive correlation between fiscal discretion and output 
variation in Pak-Economy over data set period, a 1 percent increase in fiscal discretion of 
government spending results in 1.5 percent increase in output volatility. The similar size 
of fiscal discretion causes 0.25 percent output volatility for real figures. In both the cases 
fiscal discretion increased output gap.  
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 83 
84 85 86 87 88 89 90 12 93 94 
95 96 
97 98 
99 
00 01 
02 
03 
04 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025
O
u
tp
u
t 
V
a
ri
a
ti
o
n
 
51:4, 356 Ismail and Husain 
 
Fiscal Discretion and Employment Variation 
 
 
Over this period the 0.05 percent increase in fiscal discretion caused employment 
level variation to increase by 0.01 percent. The surprising feature of this fiscal discretion 
through government spending to increase employment opportunities probably did not 
address the purpose. Economically speaking the study finds a failure on part of fiscal 
planners and public policy makers unable to reduce unemployment despite a consistent 
deficit at budget, which is in a way a reason for piling external and internal debt.  
 
Fiscal Discretion and Inflation Variation 
 
 
This figure displays negative correlation between fiscal discretion and inflation 
variation over the data set time period but for further hidden link exposure the study 
broke the data set into political and non-political rules. An increase in fiscal discretion by 
0.5 percent decreased inflation merely less than 0.1 percent. It seems that fiscal spending 
either did not control inflation or it was not used effectively to curtail inflation to the 
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desired range. Intuitively the inflation in Pak-Economy is cost-push in nature, rather 
demand-pull. The scatter sketch for figures shows that most of the time the fiscal 
discretion and inflation spotted close to the origin, which reflects fiscal discretion 
neutrality. The flatter trend discloses the insensitivity but the negatively sloped trend does 
exhibit the possibility to counter inflation volatility with increase in fiscal discretion. 
Intuitively the study claims the inflation variation in Pak-Economy cost-push inflation as 
increased public spending is decelerating the rate of increase in price level.     
To estimate the fiscal discretion and macro-economic variables’ volatility a 
uniform statistical measure is used, which is variance. Fatás and Mihov (2003), used ‘Є’t 
for quantitative estimates of discretionary policy. While the degree of discretion and the 
variation in discretion was evaluated by√       , but due to quarterly data unavailability 
on output and employment the study used simply variance to attain yearly based 
variability in the macro-economic variables of output, employment level and inflation. 
 
log(σyt)  = θ + λ log(σ
Є
t) + μ
ʹ
Xt + νt 
Intercept –5.656 (–0.856) 
Fiscal Discretion 0.039 (0.769) 
Trade Openness 3.392 (0.758) 
R
2 0.510 
 
The study finds insignificant role of fiscal discretion on output of Pak-Economy, 
which means policy makers over this period did not focus on government spending for 
gross domestic product growth. Similarly the trade openness too, is insignificant, 
supported by the consistent trade deficit at current account. The study suspects the 
possibility of substantial government spending on export promoting projects but 
sustained current account deficit and discretion exercised by the fiscal planners could not 
win investors confidence. This is why output volatility is not addressed effectively.  
 
log(σEMt)  = θ + λ log(σ
Є
t) + μ
ʹ
Xt + νt 
Intercept –0.029 (–0.006) 
Fiscal Discretion 0.000 (0.000) 
Trade Openness –1.703 (–0.645) 
R
2 0.840 
 
This table gives insignificant results of fiscal discretion on employment level of 
Pak-Economy. This means fiscal discretion failed to raise employment opportunities. It is 
a consequence of fiscal planning against labour intensive projects. This might be the 
reason for consistent increase in informal sector in Pak-Economy and the ultimate reason 
for high consumption driven and poorly documented economy. Economic theory is 
evident for poor or fall in GDP growth if maximum government spending is allocated for 
current expenditures in present. This results in fall in future growth as well as living 
standards.  
That is, the fiscal discretion did not influence the macroeconomic variable of 
employment which is the most important variable in Keynesian economics. In a way, 
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public policy did not focus the involuntarily unemployed labour force of Pakistan. 
Intuitively, it is responsible for low growth due to under utilisation of available economic 
resources. 
 
log(σInft)  = θ + λ log(σ
Є
t) + μ
ʹ
Xt + νt 
Intercept –0.522 (–0.128) 
Fiscal Discretion –0.021 (–0.278) 
Trade Openness –1.225 (–0.445) 
R
2 0.007 
 
The fiscal discretion is insignificant as it did not address inflation for the data set 
of Pak-Economy. But trade openness has negative but significant impact on inflation. But 
trade openness did have significant impact on inflation. It means increase in trade 
openness caused an increase in inflation. It is due to increased dependence on imports 
and absence of scale effect due to very small export sector. 
Through this attempt the study exposes the political and institutional stance of the 
ruling parties in Pakistan in managing fiscal tools particularly government spending. The 
study argues constitutional changes in political parties’ agenda by imposing restrictions 
on current government spending especially through structural budget adjustment of at 
least 0.5 percent of tax revenue. 
 
7.  CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
As the explanatory variables used in this study do not influence the government 
spending except the lag based spending by government, so it is assumed that fiscal 
spending is made on the basis of last year spending. This makes the study to presume that 
neither development expenditures nor current expenditures are influenced by a change in 
economic activity; this is why government spending in Pakistan over this period of study 
remained insignificant for macro-economic variables of output, employment and 
inflation. Succinctly, fiscal spending does not address these variables at all i.e. the fiscal 
spending is independent of economic situation or it was not counter cyclical.  
Aggressive government spending on current expenditures of defence and interest 
payments reduced the available funds to stimulate the economic activity. The study finds 
the absence of simulation as econometric models were probably used only for 
predictions. The study suggests the use of these models by the government of Pakistan to 
assess the effects of increase or decrease in government spending by a certain percentage 
on output, employment and inflation. Further loans should not be taken unless costs and 
benefits analysis do not suggests. There is a need for looking into non-defence and non-
interest spending to be reorganised so that policy-makers can address economic activity 
driven variables to reduce the gap between potential and actual output.  
The study recommends exploring the government spending on current and 
development expenditures to investigate whether this spending is in the line of changing 
economic conditions. This activity will enable the policy-makers to find accurately they 
anticipated the new levels of production, employment and price level. The study suggests 
to find alternatives of funding budget deficits as it may have pushed the discount and 
interest rates up which probably resulted in ‘crowding-out effect’.  
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To reduce defence expenditures the study necessitates a no war pact between 
Pakistan and India for a period of five years initially followed by a mutual agreement on 
defence budget reduction. Sustained deficit budgets increased government borrowing 
both from local and foreign donors. This increased borrowing raised the discount rate 
which increased deindustrialisation due to expensive money from Pakistan. The country 
needs structural budget adjustment as well as a maximum limit on all types of 
government spending to avoid unnecessary budget deficits and active participation of 
practicing economists to make budget. It will not only reduce lavish cabinet spending but 
will improve public trust in politicians along with restriction on irresponsible rulers’ 
behaviour.    
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